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I.  INTRODUCTION 
There are over 570 federally-recognized Tribal Nations in the 
United States and more than 330 tribal courts serving as the judicial branch 
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of those nations.1 Yet, there is little mention of the existence of tribal courts 
in most mainstream civil procedure courses taught in the over 200 law 
schools in the United States. To gain any knowledge as to the existence of 
these courts, law students must take a course on federal Indian law, which 
is not available in the majority of law schools. In fact, less than twenty law 
schools offer a series of courses forming an Indian law program.2 Thus, the 
invisibility of tribal courts is perpetuated through curriculum omission in 
mainstream civil procedure courses and rarely remedied through offering a 
stand-alone course on federal Indian law.3 Tribal Nations have existed from 
time immemorial with their own laws, dispute resolution systems, and 
governing structures. This lack of attention and suppression of information 
serves only to reinforce colonizing ideas of subsuming tribal governance into 
the forums set up by the United States. 
 This article will discuss the history of formal tribal courts as first 
established to control American Indian populations in the late 1800s.4 As 
tools of oppression, the first judicial forums established on American Indian 
reservations were the Code of Indian Offenses Courts, also known as the 
C.F.R. Courts (Code of Federal Regulations Courts).5 The Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 signaled a shift in policy, which provided for the 
adoption of tribal constitutions.6 Under the Department of Interior, the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs personnel developed boilerplate constitutions for 
adoption by Tribal Nations.7 These constitutions often included provisions 
for the establishment of tribal courts. 
Through U.S. Supreme Court decisions and federal laws, the 
criminal and civil jurisdiction of tribal courts has been limited. The U.S. 
                                                           
ǂ This article is dedicated to the tribal sovereignty warriors working in Indian country to keep 
our Indigenous legal traditions alive and strong. My Dakota name is included. I am a citizen 
of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota Oyate and have Rosebud Lakota heritage. 
1 See Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services From the United States 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 84 Fed. Reg. 1200 (Feb. 1, 2019) (listing the 573 federally-
recognized Tribal Nations); see also Tribal Courts, TRIBAL COURT 
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/justice.htm 
[https://perma.cc/BHX4-FE8G] (providing a directory of tribal courts in the United States). 
2 See The State of Indian Law at ABA-Accredited Law Schools, NAT’L NATIVE AM. BAR 
ASS’N (2019), https://www.nativeamericanbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Final-Draft.-
State-of-Indian-Law-at-ABA-Accredited-Schools.-May-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6KB-
6L2H] (listing sixteen certificate Indian law programs and thirty-one law schools offering 
more than one Indian law course at ABA-accredited law schools).  
3 Id. 
4 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.04[3][c][iv][B], at 266–
67 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. 
5  Id. 
6 See generally Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984, 25 
U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. (originally 25 U.S.C. § 261 et seq.). 
7 See Frank Pommersheim, What Must be Done to Achieve the Vision of the Twenty-First 
Century Tribal Judiciary, 7-WTR KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 8, 12 (1997). 
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Supreme Court has also opined that the U.S. Congress holds plenary 
authority over American Indian Tribes.8 Utilizing this authority, the U.S. 
Congress has legislated federal criminal jurisdiction as concurrent on all 
tribal lands with tribal court jurisdiction and has provided a mechanism to 
delegate federal criminal jurisdiction to state legal systems.9 In the civil 
jurisdiction sphere, the U.S. Supreme Court has established processes for 
federal courts to review tribal civil jurisdiction determinations and for the 
refiling of cases from tribal courts to federal courts based on the status of 
civil defendants as non-Indians or non-members.10 
Following a discussion on the history and function of tribal courts, 
this article will examine the limitations on tribal court civil jurisdiction set 
forth in U.S. Supreme Court decisions.11 Through a critical examination of 
the U.S. authority and legal basis for review of tribal court determinations 
or decisions, this article will provide commentary on the ungrounded nature 
of the assertion of U.S. federal court review over tribal court decision-
making.12 Finally, the article will recommend a government-to-government 
treaty agreement to set the framework for civil jurisdictional issues arising 
between Tribal Nations and the United States.13 
II.  QUESTIONING THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURTS OF 
INDIAN OFFENSES 
Legal scholars of federal Indian law divide U.S. Indian policy into 
distinct periods to allow for a more cohesive understanding of legislative, 
executive, and judicial actions. However, policies from former eras may 
arise or continue into a time period viewed on the macro-level as a period 
characterized by a policy shift. Therefore, the following U.S. Indian policy 
eras offer an attempt at organizing the various actions of the branches of the 
                                                           
8 See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 
U.S. 375, 380–82 (1886); see also Angelique EagleWoman, Bringing Balance to Mid-North 
America: Re-Structuring the Sovereign Relationships Between Tribal Nations and the 
United States, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 671, 678 (2012).  
Without identifying any constitutional foundation, federal courts classify 
the relationship between Tribes and the U.S. government as political, 
and affirm that the U.S. Congress has ‘plenary’ authority over Tribes. In 
the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Congress has the ability ‘[t]o regulate 
Commerce . . . with the Indian tribes’ and this one phrase has been 
stretched into ‘plenary’ authority over Tribal Nations.  
Id. 
9 See ANGELIQUE WAMBDI EAGLEWOMAN & STACY L. LEEDS, MASTERING 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 45-63 (2d ed. 2019). 
10 Id. at 74–77. 
11 See infra Part IV. 
12 See infra Part V. 
13 See infra Part VI. 
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U.S. government towards American Indians since the formation of the 
United States. 
A.  The Context of Shifting U.S. Indian Policies 
U.S. Indian policy has been analogized to a perpetual wave 
machine14 or a pendulum swinging between two opposite poles.15 On the 
one side, the United States has recognized and engaged with Tribal Nations 
on a government-to-government level. On the other side, there has been an 
effort to completely disregard Tribal Nations’ authority, withhold federal 
recognition, and undermine the protection of American Indian people and 
Tribal governments. The table below illustrates the eras of U.S. Indian 




Disregard of Tribal Nation 
Status 
Treaty Era (sovereign-to-sovereign)  
1778 to Mid-1800s 
 





 Assimilation/Allotment Era 
Late 1800s to Early 1900s 
Indian Self-Government Era 
1930s to 1940s 
 
 Termination of Tribal 
Government Status Era 
1940s to 1960s 
Indian Self-Determination Era 




During the treaty era, the U.S. engaged in negotiations and legal agreements 
with Tribal Nations to establish peaceful alliances and eventually large 
                                                           
14 See JUDITH V. ROYSTER, MICHAEL C. BLUMM & ELIZABETH ANN KRONK, 
NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 51 
(3d ed. 2013) (“Like a perpetual wave machine, federal policy has flowed between two poles: 
the protection of tribal autonomy on the one hand, and the incorporation and assimilation 
of Indians into the majority society on the other.”). 
15 See EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 9, at 10. 
16 Id. at 11–22. 
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property transfers.17 As the U.S. sought to expand its territorial jurisdiction 
and rebuff land title claims by other European-derived governments, U.S. 
officials entered into treaties as a means to expediently accomplish this 
result, whereas American Indians engaged in treaty alliances as a form of 
kinship recognition and shared territoriality.18   
In a series of three cases commonly referred to as the “Marshall 
Trilogy,” the U.S. Supreme Court, under the authority of Chief Justice John 
Marshall, fully extinguished tribal ownership of all lands within the territory 
claimed by the United States, asserting that, as the successor of Great 
Britain, the U.S. gained superior title through the “doctrine of discovery” to 
tribal lands.19 In the second case in the trilogy, the Court opined that the 
Cherokee Nation and all tribal governments lacked constitutional standing 
to sue in federal courts.20 The Court coined the term “domestic dependent 
nations” when dismissing the lawsuit brought to enforce U.S. treaty rights 
disregarded by the state of Georgia in seizing tribal reservation lands.21 The 
third case in the trilogy established federal preemption over Indian affairs 
in relation to state laws and recognized that tribal governments existed “as 
distinct, independent political communities”—although under the 
jurisdiction of the U.S.22 These three decisions continue to form the 
foundation of U.S. property rights and the assertion of jurisdiction over 
tribal governments and remain good law in the United States. 
 With the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction on the eastern seaboard, 
the next policy in Indian affairs was to remove all Tribal Nations to locations 
west of the Appalachian mountain range and eventually beyond the 
Mississippi River.23 The removal era overlapped with the reservation era, in 
which federal officials and courts recognized the reserved lands as fully 
under the jurisdiction of Tribal Nations in regard to domestic affairs.24 The 
extent of this jurisdiction will be discussed in the sections on criminal and 
civil jurisdiction below.25 
                                                           
17 Id. at 11–13. 
18 Id. at 12. 
19 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 572–74, 584 (1823). 
20 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 13 (1831). 
21 Id. 
22 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 519 (1832). 
23 See Indian Removal Act of May 28, 1830, §§ 2, 7, Pub. L. No. 21-148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830). 
24 The online resource for treaties between Tribal Nations and the U.S. is available through 
the Oklahoma State University digital collection of editor Charles Kappler, online at: 
https://dc.library.okstate.edu/digital/collection/kapplers.  
25 See infra Sections III.C.1, III.C.2. 
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B.  Courts of Indian Offenses as Assimilation Era Federal 
Instrumentalities 
 In the most devastating era of U.S. Indian policy, the 
assimilation/allotment era, the pendulum swung to social experimentation 
on Indian children who were placed in mandatory government boarding 
schools, the dividing up of the reserved land base in violation of treaties, 
and the appointment and establishment by the United States of Indian 
agents on reservations who exercised complete control.26 The U.S. Supreme 
Court opined in several decisions throughout this era that the U.S. Congress 
exercised “plenary”—or absolute—authority over tribal peoples and 
governments.27 The basis for this assertion was justified by the rationale that 
the differences between European norms and American Indian norms set 
up a civilization hierarchy with Europeans “superior” to American Indians.28 
It is during this time period that the federal agency charged with 
implementing U.S. Indian law and policy, the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA), through the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, first authorized the 
implementation of the Courts of Indian Offenses.29 
While U.S. Indian agents were exercising judicial power, some 
Tribal Nations adapted traditional dispute resolution processes to conform 
to the Euro-American style of formal court systems. In the 1820s, the 
Cherokee Nation established written tribal laws, a tribal constitution, and 
tribal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over the tribal territory.30 By 1898, 
the United States terminated the Cherokee Nation government, as well as 
the other governments known as the Five Civilized Tribes (Cherokee, 
Chickasaw, Choctaw, Muscogee (Creek), and Seminole tribal governments), 
during the assimilation period of Indian policy.31 
                                                           
26 See Indian General Allotment Act, Pub. L. No. 49-105, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) [repealed]. 
27 See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886) (“The power of the general 
government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in 
numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they 
dwell. It must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else; because 
the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States; because it has 
never been denied; and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.”); see also 
Lonewolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority over tribal relations 
has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed 
a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.”). 
28 See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590 (1823) (“But the tribes of Indians inhabiting 
this country were fierce savages whose occupation was war and whose subsistence was drawn 
chiefly from the forest.”).  
29 See Gloria Valencia Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 
225, 232–37 (1994).  
30  LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION: ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL AT 
DIFFERENT PERIODS 11-12 (1852), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/american-indian-
consts/PDF/28014183.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8QW-CAVT].  
31 See Act of June 28, 1898, Curtis Act, Pub. L. No. 55-517, 30 Stat. 495 (1899). 
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 In his 1882 annual report, U.S. Indian Commissioner, Hiram 
Price, advocated for Christian missionaries, as teachers, to civilize American 
Indians in the mandatory schools operated by the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs.32 The next year, in his November 1, 1883, annual report, 
Commissioner Price expressed his feelings against all forms of Indian 
cultural practices as follows, “[e]very man familiar with Indian life will bear 
witness to the pernicious influence of these savage rites and heathenish 
customs.”33 He was particularly vehement about targeting medicine men in 
tribal communities.34 
In response, the Secretary of the Interior, Henry Teller, established 
the Courts of Indian Offenses through Bureau regulations issued on 
September 22, 1884, and approved a companion legal code.35 As a civilizing 
influence, the U.S. Indian agent was empowered to select tribal police 
officers to form three-judge panels to determine sentences with appeals to 
the BIA.36 
The companion legal code, the Code of Indian Offenses, outlawed 
the spiritual and religious practices of American Indians, punished 
medicine men, punished parents who resisted their children being taken to 
boarding schools, and allowed total control by the U.S. Indian agent on 
reservations backed by military forts at nearby locations. The Code 
provided as the fourth rule: 
4th. The “sun-dance,” the “scalp-dance,” the “war-dance,” 
and all other so-called feasts assimilating thereto, shall be 
considered “Indian offenses,” and any Indian found guilty 
of being a participant in any one or more of these 
“offenses” shall, for the first offense committed, be 
punished by withholding from the person or persons so 
found guilty by the court his or their rations for a period 
not exceeding ten days; and if found guilty of any 
subsequent offense under this rule, shall by punished by 
withholding his or their rations for a period not less than 
fifteen days, nor more than thirty days, or by incarceration 
in the agency prison for a period not exceeding thirty days.37 
                                                           
32 Francis Paul Prucha, Extract from the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs October 10, 1882, in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES POLICY 156 (Univ. 
of Neb. Press 3rd ed. 2000). 
33 Id. at 158. 
34 Id. at 159. 
35 THEODORE HAAS, THE INDIAN AND THE LAW-1 6 (1949). 
36 Id. 
37 See Code of Indian Offenses, OFFICE OF ROBERT N. CLINTON, http://robert-
clinton.com/?page_id=289 [https://perma.cc/W8UL-4ZR7]; see also, U.S. OFF. OF INDIAN 
AFF., SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, REGUL. OF THE INDIAN DEP’T 89 (The Indian Bureau 1884).  
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Asserting full federal authority, the U.S. Indian agent could punish 
“offenders” by withholding their food rations.38 Further, the sixth rule of the 
Code provided severe punishment for medicine men. 
6th. The usual practices of so-called “medicine-men” shall 
be considered “Indian offenses” cognizable by the Court 
of Indian Offenses, and whenever it shall be proven to the 
satisfaction of the court that the influence or practice of a 
so-called “medicine-man” operates as a hindrance to the 
civilization of a tribe, or that said “medicine-man” resorts 
to any artifice or device to keep the Indians under his 
influence, or shall adopt any means to prevent the 
attendance of children at the agency schools, or shall use 
any of the arts of a conjurer to prevent the Indians from 
abandoning their heathenish rites and customs, he shall be 
adjudged guilty of an Indian offense, and upon conviction 
of any one or more of these specified practices, or, any 
other, in the opinion of the court, of an equally anti-
progressive nature, shall be confined in the agency prison 
for a term not less than ten days, or until such time as he 
shall produce evidence satisfactory to the court, and 
approved by the agent, that he will forever abandon all 
practices styled Indian offenses under this rule.39 
In the United States, a country with a constitutional provision guaranteeing 
freedom of religion,40 the BIA, under the executive branch, enforced legal 
rules to indefinitely incarcerate practitioners of tribal spiritualities or until 
the medicine men “forever abandon all practices styled Indian offenses,” 
such as tribal ceremonies.41 Further, the Code detailed that the courts would 
have the same civil jurisdiction as a justice of the peace in the surrounding 
state or territory.42  
Although named courts, the Courts of Indian Offenses were under 
the executive branch and did not resemble federal or territorial courts 
during the contemporaneous period. Rather, they operated as 
instrumentalities of the assimilation policy. According to the primary federal 
decision regarding the courts, their creation was justified as authorized by a 
                                                           
38 U.S. OFF. OF INDIAN AFF., SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, REGUL. OF THE INDIAN DEP’T 89 (The 
Indian Bureau 1884). 
39 Id. at 89–90. 
40 See U.S. CONST. Amend. I. 
41 U.S. OFF. OF INDIAN AFF., SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, REGUL. OF THE INDIAN DEP’T 89–90 
(The Indian Bureau 1884). 
42 See Code of Indian Offenses, supra note 37.  
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treaty entered into with the Umatilla Indians, as follows in the United States 
v. Clapox43 decision:   
By this treaty the Umatilla Indians engaged to submit to 
any rule that might be prescribed by the United States for 
their government. This obviously includes the power to 
organize and maintain this Indian court and police, and to 
specify the acts or conduct concerning which it shall have 
jurisdiction. This treaty is an “act” or law “relating to Indian 
affairs,” – the affairs of these Indians, and by said section 
46544 the power to prescribe a rule for carrying the same 
into effect is given to the president, who has exercised the 
same in this case through the proper instrumentality, - the 
secretary of the interior.45 
This interpretation of a bilateral treaty as allowing one government the 
authority to enact and enforce any rule against the other government is in 
contradiction to the purpose of entering a treaty. This type of revisionist 
interpretation to provide absolute authority over American Indians was a 
hallmark of the assimilation period. The Court in Clapox further stated that 
the purpose of these forums was unlike the generally understood function 
of courts in the United States.46 The language used to state that conclusion 
is demeaning to American Indians and undermined the credibility of these 
forums as legitimate, legal courts. The Court stated: 
These “[C]ourts of Indian [O]ffenses” are not the 
constitutional courts provided for in section 1, art. 3, 
Const., which [C]ongress only has the power to “ordain 
and establish,” but mere educational and disciplinary 
instrumentalities, by which the government of the United 
States is endeavoring to improve and elevate the condition 
of these dependent tribes to whom it sustains the relation 
of guardian. In fact, the reservation itself is in the nature of 
a school, and the Indians are gathered there, under the 
charge of an agent, for the purpose of acquiring the habits, 
ideas, and aspirations which distinguish the civilized from 
the uncivilized man.47 
                                                           
43 United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888). 
44 Regulations by President, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, P.L. 116-179, 25 U.S.C. § 9 (2020) 
(“The President may prescribe such regulations as he may think fit for carrying into effect 
the various provisions of any act relating to Indian affairs, and for the settlement of the 
accounts of Indian affairs.”). 
45 Clapox, 35 F. at 577. 
46 See id.  
47 Id.  
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The challenge to the authority of the Court of Indian Offenses on the 
Umatilla Reservation originated in the arrest and jailing of an Indian woman 
for alleged adultery, followed by several men forcibly releasing her from the 
jail. Not only did the court fail to find a statutory basis for the adultery 
conviction which it upheld, but the court also stated that the Umatilla 
woman had committed a crime against the United States to uphold the 
conviction.48 
 Throughout the years, similar rulings by federal courts have led 
to distrust and skepticism of courts’ abilities to deliver justice for American 
Indians engaged in federal and state court proceedings. Bending the law to 
assert authority over American Indians through convoluting and demeaning 
rationales has often been the norm in federal Indian law decisions. 
 The Code of Indian Offenses was revised in 1892 under the 
direction of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Thomas J. Morgan, to 
ameliorate some of the issues in the original set of rules. For example, a 
process for one-year terms for tribal judges sitting in district courts was set 
forth, with appeals taken to a full panel of all the judges on the reservation.49 
Also, rather than indefinite incarceration, medicine men faced a sentence 
of between ten to thirty days for the first offense, and subsequent convictions 
carried a maximum sentence of up to six months.50 The revisions 
incorporated misdemeanors from the surrounding state or territories and 
called for similar sentencing.51 The revisions also included a provision on 
the courts solemnizing marriages, although American Indians performed 
marriage ceremonies according to traditional customs since time 
immemorial.52 
 The question of the authority to establish the Courts of Indian 
Offenses seems to be answered by the colonial mentality of asserting 
dominance over American Indians based on notions of racial and cultural 
superiority. The legal machinations used to justify imposing these types of 
courts outlawing the cultural and spiritual practices of Indigenous 
populations contradicts the constitutional principles of freedom of religion 
and basic rights of human existence. 
III.  TRANSITION TO INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT 
AND MODERN TRIBAL COURTS 
                                                           
48 Id. at 578–79. 
49 Prucha, supra note 32, at 185. 
50 Id. at 186. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 186–87. 
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The passage of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act heralded an 
end to the worst aspects of the assimilation/allotment era.53 The first section 
of the law halted the allotment policy of parceling out the reserved lands of 
Tribal Nations.54 Another section authorized the adoption of tribal 
constitutions and delineated the powers of tribal governments.55 The BIA 
developed boilerplate tribal constitutions based on club associations with 
bylaws as available for adoption by tribal governments.56 The tribal 
constitutions did not create the counterbalance of three branches of 
government similar to the U.S. governmental system. Rather, the 
governmental power resided in one body, the Tribal Council, as the 
executive and legislative authority, with oversight of the judicial power.  
Even with this less than ideal governance structure, the provisions 
of the IRA signaled a return to self-government for Tribal Nations and the 
relaxing of the grip of federal authority by U.S. Indian agents in tribal 
communities. Tribal peoples existed for thousands of years prior to the 
formation of the United States and governed their own societies with laws 
and dispute resolution processes across the Western Hemisphere.57 The 
shift in U.S. policy from military control to the recognition of tribal authority 
to self-govern was heartily embraced by Tribal Nations. 
A.  The Operation of Tribal Courts 
Under the policy of Indian self-government, a majority of Tribal 
Nations re-established tribal dispute resolution or court systems that provide 
law and order functions, decision-making for civil matters, and the handling 
of family law cases.58 Customary or traditional law may be employed in tribal 
judicial opinions alongside tribal statutes and other legal sources.59 
With a majority of tribal governments adopting the BIA-approved 
constitutional models, Tribal Nations saw a return to former authority and 
autonomy, away from the U.S. Indian agent system.60 These self-government 
era tribal courts replaced the former Courts of Indian Offenses and have 
the authorization of inherent tribal sovereignty legitimizing the forums.61 
                                                           
53 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5144. 
54 Id. § 5101. 
55 Id. § 5123. 
56 See EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 9, at 69. 
57 See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (recognizing that the Cherokee Nation and 
all tribal governments existed prior to the U.S. Constitution and that tribal law governs 
criminal law process in tribal court proceedings). 
58 See generally Tribal Court Clearinghouse, TRIBAL LAW AND POL’Y INST., 
https://www.tribal-institute.org/ [https://perma.cc/3WFR-ZVTV].  
59 See generally MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW (2011). 
60 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at § 4.04[3][a][i], at 256–58. 
61  Id. § 4.04[3][c][iv][B], at 265. 
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Tribal court systems handle both civil and criminal cases for matters 
impacting the tribal citizenry and government. Tribal courts review Tribal 
Council actions for conformity with the relevant tribal constitutions, resolve 
disputes in the commercial realm, and provide remedies in the area of tort 
law.62  
Tribal Nations rejecting the boilerplate constitutions had similar 
opportunities to benefit from the Indian Reorganization Act and assert tribal 
governmental powers under both the federal law and the re-assertion of 
tribal sovereignty. The Navajo Nation has not adopted a tribal constitution 
and operates one of the most well-known tribal court systems in the world. 
One of the most celebrated aspects of the Navajo Nation’s justice system is 
the reinvigoration of the peacemaking process as an alternative to formal 
dispute adjudication in tribal district courts. Thus, the Peacemaker Courts 
represent Indigenous legal principles carried forward into contemporary 
times to promote cultural norms, lessons, laws, and practices of the Navajo 
peoples.63 
For various reasons, a small number of tribal governments have 
continued to use the Courts of Indian Offenses models, now commonly 
referred to as “C.F.R. Courts,” due to the application of the Code of Federal 
Regulations as the governing law.64 Unlike tribal courts, the C.F.R. Courts 
operate under the authority of the BIA and are circumscribed by the federal 
regulations on civil and criminal jurisdiction.65 Some commentators criticize 
the continued use of C.F.R. Courts as inhibiting the development of tribal 
law and application of customary law.66 For those tribal governments unable 
to devote financial resources to a judicial branch, C.F.R. Courts have the 
advantage of BIA funding.67 
Finally, tribal governments rejecting the three models of court 
systems described above can retain judicial authority in the Tribal Council. 
The entanglement between politics and judicial neutrality does not make 
this a best practice in tribal communities. As sovereign entities within 
territorial boundaries over domestic affairs, Tribal Nations have choices in 
the structuring of court systems and dispute resolution practices. 
                                                           
62 JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL 
STUDIES 122–33 (2016). 
63 See Hon. Robert Yazzie, “Hozho Nahasdalii” –We Are Now in Good Relations: Navajo 
Restorative Justice, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 117, 120–24 (1996). 
64 See Court of Indian Offenses, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR: INDIAN AFFS., 
https://www.bia.gov/regional-offices/southern-plains/court-indian-offenses 
[https://perma.cc/GV8Y-U639]. 
65 See 25 C.F.R. Part 11. 
66 See Gavin Clarkson, Reclaiming Jurisprudential Sovereignty: A Tribal Judiciary Analysis, 
50 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 489–90 (2002). 
67 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at § 4.04[3][c][B], at 267.  
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B.  Tribal Appellate Courts 
Tribal governments have options in creating the appellate process 
of tribal courts. The first option enables a tribal government to form an 
appellate court under its own laws. There are many of these appellate 
courts, such as the Mashantucket Pequot Court of Appeals, the Seminole 
Tribe of Florida Appellate Court, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Supreme Court, 
and the Court of Appeals of the Shakopee Mdewakanton. An appeal of a 
Navajo Nation district court decision goes to the Navajo Nation Supreme 
Court, and the Cherokee Nation district court decisions are likewise 
appealable to the Cherokee Nation Supreme Court.68 
Another option is for a tribal government to enter into a regional 
appellate court system. Usually, this will require a formal resolution from 
each tribal government’s Tribal Council accompanied by a fee-sharing 
agreement to participate. Some examples of these appellate consortiums 
include the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals, the Northwest 
Intertribal Court System, Northern California Tribal Court Coalition, the 
Intertribal Court of California, and the Southwest Intertribal Court of 
Appeals.69 
The Tribal Council, exercising discretionary authority to hear 
appeals from the tribal district court(s), may also retain jurisdiction over the 
appellate process.70 This is not a best practice due to the possible 
entanglement of political issues with the role of neutral decision-maker. The 
right of appeal is recognized across the spectrum of appellate court fora for 
tribal jurisdictions and contemplated by tribal government in mandating the 
appropriate appeal process.71 
C.  Tribal Court Jurisdiction: Criminal and Civil 
 The criminal and civil jurisdiction of tribal courts is set forth in 
the tribal laws establishing the court systems.72 For most governments, their 
court systems assert jurisdiction over claims arising from conduct within the 
government’s territory. For example, the government of Greece may apply 
its laws to the full extent throughout its territorial boundaries, and the Greek 
courts may resolve any and all criminal and civil cases arising within those 
same boundaries. In contrast, the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Supreme 
Court have both sought to restrict the full extent of tribal governmental 
                                                           
68 CHEROKEE CONST. art. VIII, § 4, cl. 7. 
69 See About, NW. INTERTRIBAL CT. SYS., https://www.nics.ws/about.html 
[https://perma.cc/CE8R-B5RL]. See also SWITCA Rep., AM. INDIAN LAW CTR., INC., 
https://www.ailc-inc.org/our-work/switca/ [https://perma.cc/WYW4-EY9G]; 
EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 9, at 72–3. 
70 See generally Tribal Court Clearinghouse, supra note 58. 
71 See EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 9, at 72–3. 
72 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at § 4.04[3][c]. 
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authority within the tribal territory. These issues are further discussed 
below. 
1.  Criminal Jurisdiction 
The starting point for tribal court jurisdiction is the criminal realm 
because this is the area first intruded upon by federal law—displacing 
exclusive tribal governmental authority. In 1883, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Ex parte Crow Dog held that criminal activity involving two tribal 
citizens was not within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.73 Rather, legally-
binding treaties retained criminal jurisdiction for tribal governments.74 
Responding to the outcry of public interest associations and lobbying by the 
BIA, the U.S. Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act in 1885 to assert 
federal criminal jurisdiction for enumerated crimes that were considered 
felonies within Indian reservations and lands when allegedly committed by 
an Indian person.75 Formally, the law applied to “Indian country” as defined 
in the federal criminal code.76 
As federal laws were enacted in the criminal jurisdiction realm over 
Native Americans, a complicated scheme was put in place, which has been 
critically referred to as a criminal jurisdiction maze. U.S. Supreme Court 
rulings and federal laws have led to the following outcome: crimes 
committed by an alleged Indian perpetrator in Indian country can be 
concurrently charged in both tribal and federal courts;77 crimes committed 
by an alleged non-Indian perpetrator in Indian country with an Indian victim 
can be charged federally, but not tribally;78 and crimes committed by an 
alleged non-Indian perpetrator in Indian country with a non-Indian victim 
can be charged by state authorities.79  
Further, during the termination era of U.S. Indian policy, the 
federal government, under Public Law 280, delegated criminal authority in 
Indian country to six mandatory states and allowed other states to opt-in.80 
Those states receiving federal delegations share concurrent criminal 
authority with tribal courts over alleged Indian perpetrators and are 
responsible for charging non-Indians in Indian country regardless of the 
status of the victim. 
                                                           
73 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
74 Id. at 572. 
75 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
76 Id. § 1151. 
77 See U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004). 
78 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). 
79 See generally U.S. v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882) (holding that states have exclusive 
jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes against other non-Indians in Indian 
country). 
80 18 U.S.C. § 1162. 
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To further complicate matters, Congress enacted the Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), severely restraining the criminal sentencing 
authority of tribal courts.81 Tribal courts face limitations when exercising 
criminal jurisdiction. For example, tribal courts can only impose up to a 
one-year incarceration and/or a fine of up to $5,000 per criminal count, 
including the most serious felony-level crimes.82 After public attention was 
drawn to the lack of federal and state prosecutions and growing criminal 
activity in Indian country,83 the 2010 Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) 
was passed and incorporated into the ICRA with mixed reactions.84 Under 
the TLOA, certain requirements for tribal courts were set forth, tied to 
increased criminal sentencing by imposing up to three years of incarceration 
and/or a fine of $15,000 per count.85 However, tribal courts were pressured 
into adhering to state and federal procedures in criminal prosecutions, 
resulting in trials that carried costly price tags with no additional funding.86 
Another feature of the TLOA was to allow tribal governments to 
initiate retrocession of state criminal jurisdiction granted under Public Law 
280 and return federal criminal jurisdiction as concurrent in tribal 
territories.87 Prior to the 2010 provision, only state governments had the 
authority to petition for retrocession of criminal jurisdiction in Indian 
country. A handful of tribal governments have successfully utilized this 
provision. Pursuant to land claims settlements and specific statutes involving 
state criminal jurisdiction, federal laws have often contained language 
providing state criminal, and sometimes civil adjudicatory jurisdiction, for 
cases involving reservation Indians over the designated tribal territory and 
should be researched per tribal government to determine proper 
jurisdiction.88  
With the limitations on tribal court sentencing, Native American 
communities must rely on federal and state law enforcement to devote 
attention, time, and resources to keeping women, children, and all members 
of the community safe. Unfortunately, this reliance has been a dismal 
                                                           
81 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304. 
82 Id. § 1302(a)(7)(B). 
83 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L USA, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO 
PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 
(2007), https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/mazeofinjustice.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVZ8-
W65Y] (noting the pervasive sexual violence against American Indian and Alaska Native 
women in the United States).   
84 See Jasmine Owens, “Historic” in A Bad Way: How the Tribal Law and Order Act 
Continues the American Tradition of Providing Inadequate Protection to American Indian 
and Alaska Native Rape Victims, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 518–21 (2012). 
85 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b). 
86 See EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 9, at 49–50. 
87 18 U.S.C. § 1162(d). 
88 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4 § 6.04[4], at 578–83. 
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failure. The passage of the Violence against Women Act in 2013 was an 
imperfect fix that allowed for the prosecution of special domestic violence 
offenses in tribal courts where the alleged perpetrator is a non-Indian and 
the victim is an Indian in Indian country.89 The special jurisdiction requires 
congressional renewal—placing the prosecutorial authority subject to 
political uncertainties. 
2.  Civil Jurisdiction 
The civil jurisdiction of tribal courts is set forth in tribal law as 
extending throughout the tribal territory. Tribal governments have 
established courts as forums for any type of civil action based on legislative 
authority, whether involving commercial disputes, domestic issues, personal 
injury actions, or governmental administrative matters, to name a few areas. 
In general, tribal courts follow civil procedure requirements for adjudicative 
authority based on the federal rules of civil procedure with more emphasis 
on due process rights than on enforcing strict adherence to procedural 
standards.  
The National Indian Law Library is an online resource that allows 
for the review of tribal court civil action decisions by examining the reported 
decisions in the Indian Law Reporter.90 The National Indian Law Library 
index has thirty categories for researching tribal court decisions on various 
topics, including areas from agriculture to cyberspace and employment law 
to wills and trusts.91 Through a monthly review of tribal court decisions, an 
Indian law bulletin is accessible on this website and searchable by topic for 
new developments in tribal law.92 A selection of tribal court decisions may 
also be available through mainstream legal research services. The best 
source of legal decisions will be locally through contacting the relevant tribal 
court clerk(s) for precedential decisions and access to tribal court archives. 
3.  Public Law 280 and Impacts to Tribal Courts 
As discussed above, the enactment of Public Law 280 during the 
termination era of U.S. Indian policy has impacted the operation of tribal 
courts. Under Public Law 280, specific states received federal delegations 
of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. Under the Indian Civil Rights Act 
of 1968, states opting for the federal delegation of criminal jurisdiction had 
                                                           
89 25 U.S.C. § 1304. 
90 See Indian Law Reporter: Tribal Court Cases Index, NAT’L INDIAN LAW LIBR. (Mar. 18, 
2015), https://www.narf.org/nill/ilr/ [https://perma.cc/74UV-UYK8]. 
91 Id. 
92 Indian Law Bulletins: Tribal Courts, NAT’L INDIAN LAW LIBR. (Dec. 18, 2019), 
https://www.narf.org/nill/bulletins/tribal/2019.html [https://perma.cc/7QAX-WUHL]. 
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to obtain tribal consent, and no tribal government provided such approval.93 
With the state exercise of criminal jurisdiction, some tribal governments did 
not authorize tribal courts to exercise any form of concurrent criminal 
jurisdiction due to a lack of federal funding.94 Rather, the tribal courts were 
exclusively authorized as courts of civil jurisdiction.  
Another aspect of the enactment of Public Law 280 was to open 
the state courts as alternative forums for civil actions involving Indians that 
arise in tribal territories. This civil law component of Public Law 280 is 
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 and was initially enacted to apply in the states 
of Alaska, California, Minnesota (except on the Red Lake Band of 
Chippewa Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (except the Warm Springs 
Reservation), and Wisconsin.95 The nine states currently operating with 
optional Public Law 280 jurisdiction are: Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, 
Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, and Washington.96 Civil actions 
filed in state court must involve at least one Indian party under this federal 
grant of authority for an action arising within a tribal territory.  
Two U.S. Supreme Court cases have interpreted the civil aspects of 
Public Law 280 and developed the criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory 
test to determine state authority. In Bryan v. Itasca County,97 a case arising 
in the Public Law 280 mandatory state of Minnesota, the U.S. Supreme 
Court rejected the state’s asserted taxing authority within the Leech Lake 
                                                           
93 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(1); see EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 9, at 21 (“This extension 
of state jurisdiction over tribal communities did not require tribal consent until 1968. Due to 
the often strained relationships between state government and tribal governments, the 
delegation to state authority was often unwelcome from the tribal perspective.”).  
94 See, e.g., Jerry Gardner & Ada Pecos Melton, Public Law 280: Issues and Concerns for 
Victims of Crime in Indian Country, TRIBAL COURT CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.tribal-
institute.org/articles/gardner1.htm#12 [https://perma.cc/EX8U-U9R6].  
The federal government, however, viewed Public Law 280 as a license 
to drop financial and technical support for tribal self-government and 
tribal governmental institutions in the Public Law 280 states. The 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) used it as an excuse for redirecting 
federal support on a wholesale basis away from Indian Nations in the 
‘Public Law 280 states’ and towards all other Indian Nations. The most 
striking illustration of this redirected federal support concerns the 
funding of tribal law enforcement and tribal courts. In many Public Law 
280 states, the BIA refused to support tribal law enforcement and tribal 
courts on the grounds that Public Law 280 made tribal criminal 
jurisdiction unnecessary.  
Id.  
95 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a). 
96 See Carole Goldberg & Heather Valdez Singleton, Research Priorities: Law Enforcement 
in Public Law 280 States, 2 n.4 (2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209926.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M7RH-AZRM] (noting that North Dakota required tribal consent to assert 
jurisdiction but has not gained that consent). 
97 Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976). 
17
EagleWoman: Jurisprudence and Recommendations for Tribal Court Authority Due
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
2020] JURISPRUDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS 359 
Reservation as unauthorized under the statute.98 Further, the Court opined 
that state regulatory authority, such as taxing or imposing state law within 
Indian country, was not granted in the civil sections of the law.99 Such a grant 
of authority would undermine tribal governmental authority, which was not 
supported in the legislative history or actual wording of the statute.100 In 
parsing the statute, the Court applied the Indian canon of construction for 
treaties, statutes, and regulations enacted for the benefit of Indians as 
requiring that ambiguous provisions “are to be liberally construed, doubtful 
expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.”101 Because the taxing 
conduct fell within the civil/regulatory sphere of governmental authority, the 
civil provisions of Public Law 280 did not empower states to override tribal 
governmental authority. 
Likewise, in the U.S. Supreme Court decision, California v. 
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,102 the mandatory Public Law 280 state of 
California asserted authority to shut down a tribal bingo business.103 The 
Court considered whether the state regulated similar gambling activities or 
criminally prohibited such activities.104 In determining that Public Law 280 
jurisdiction only authorized application of criminal law in tribal territories, 
the Court held that application of the criminal/prohibitory and 
civil/regulatory test nullified the state’s argument that it could assert control 
over tribal bingo operations as the state regulated comparable gambling 
activity.105 Therefore, these two decisions cabin the civil aspect of Public Law 
280 to providing state court forums for private civil actions involving an 
Indian party. 
The practical result of the civil provisions of Public Law 280 in the 
relevant states is to allow a race to the courthouse for litigants when a private 
cause of action arises in Indian country involving an Indian party.106 Some 
tribal governments and states have codified comity principles, others have 
followed such principles through court decisions, and still, others have not 
addressed the issue to date.107 In Public Law 280 states, there is concurrent 
subject matter jurisdiction for state and tribal courts for private civil actions, 
except for suits involving the tribal government or its entities as exempted 
by the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.108 
                                                           
98 Id. at 378–79. 
99 Id. at 388–89. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 392. 
102 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
103 Id. at 207.  
104 Id. at 210. 
105 Id. at 211–12. 
106 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 6.04[3][c], at 558. 
107 See Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A 
Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311, 336–45 (2000). 
108 See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 785 (2014). 
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By allowing civil actions involving Indians as private persons that 
arise in tribal territories to be heard in either state or tribal court, the exercise 
of state court jurisdiction may be viewed as undermining the activity of tribal 
courts. Legal jurisprudence is developed by the consideration of issues over 
time with judicial decisions building on rationales and strengthening bodies 
of interpretative law. For tribal courts, the incursions allowed by state forums 
hearing civil cases could work as a detriment to the development of tribal 
judicial interpretation of tribal law for civil causes of action.  
D.  Customary/Traditional Law in Tribal Courts 
Tribal Nations are pre-constitutional and indigenous to North 
America. Within these societies, dispute resolution processes were 
developed and followed to maintain harmony and balance for social 
functioning. Customary legal principles and norms have been taught 
through generations based on accounts and stories expressing both socially 
acceptable behaviors and the disapproval of unacceptable behaviors. Thus, 
children received this behavioral training early on to shape their 
understanding of proper ethical, legal, and social standards. In 
contemporary tribal courts, judges may take judicial notice of customary 
legal principles, receive expert testimony from qualified cultural knowledge 
holders, or follow precedent in decisions detailing the appropriate 
customary law for that particular tribal society. Court decisions and 
customary legal principles compose the common law of tribal courts. 
One of the most prominent traditional customary law practices is 
found in the Navajo Nation Peacemaker Court and program, which has 
been the subject of study by legal scholars throughout the world.109 In 
explaining the concept of horizontal justice in the Navajo mindset, Chief 
Justice Emeritus Robert Yazzie distinguishes the Anglo view of vertical 
justice as the adversarial system with judges as decision-makers through 
power over the parties.110 
Navajo justice is a sophisticated system of egalitarian 
relationships where group solidarity takes the place of force 
and coercion. In it, humans are not in ranks or status 
classifications from top to bottom. Instead, all humans are 
equals and make decisions as a group. The process – which 
we call “peacemaking” in English – is a system of 
                                                           
109 Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts: A Navajo Jurist’s Perspective, 
in NAVAJO NATION PEACEMAKING: LIVING TRADITIONAL JUSTICE 31 
(Marianne O. Nielsen & James V. Zion, eds., 2005). 
110 Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes From It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, in NAVAJO NATION 
PEACEMAKING: LIVING TRADITIONAL JUSTICE, 43–47 (Marianne O. Nielsen & James W. 
Zion eds., 2005). 
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relationships where there is no need for force, coercion or 
control. There are no plaintiffs or defendants; no “good 
guy” or “bad guy.” These labels are irrelevant. “Equal 
justice” and “equality before the law” mean precisely what 
they say. As Navajos, we do not think of equality as treating 
people equal before the law; they are equal in it. Again our 
Navajo language points this out in practical terms.111 
Cases are initiated in Peacemaker Court by the parties to the dispute or 
through referrals by courts, government agencies, or schools.112 Participating 
in the peacemaking program is always voluntary.113 Once the case is filed, a 
well-respected community peacemaker is assigned; the peacemaker is 
responsible for gathering interested individuals to facilitate the ceremonial 
stages of the process.114 Components of the resolution process include 
prayers, every person contributing to both speaking and listening, the ability 
of family members to respond to excuses, teachings by the peacemaker 
appropriate to the situation, and a closing with a meal.115 
 Tribal governments may codify traditional law, incorporate 
specific legal processes, or acknowledge adversarial proceedings as 
applicable law in modern tribal courts. For example, there has been a 
proliferation of Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts, providing culturally 
appropriate guidance for those entering the criminal justice system due to 
substance abuse or mental health issues.116 Other examples include court 
processes involving juveniles, such as the Red Lake Band of Chippewa in 
Minnesota establishing the Abinoojiyag Noojimoo-wigamig or Children’s 
Healing Center, with the mission statement to “[r]ealize a 20% reduction in 
juvenile delinquency and juvenile recidivism during the next five years by 
implementing a holistic comprehensive strategic plan.”117 Thus by drawing 
upon cultural principles, custom, and traditional legal concepts, tribal courts 
working within tribal communities are reinvigorating the values and 
standards that provide tribal cohesion. 
                                                           
111 Id. at 47. 
112 See Navajo Nation Peacemaking Program, TRIBAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE INNOVATION, 
http://www.tribaljustice.org/places/traditional-practices/navajo-nation-peacemaking-
program/ [https://perma.cc/EF9G-GMZQ].  
113 Id. 
114 See id. 
115 James Zion, The Dynamics of Navajo Peacemaking: Social Psychology of an American 
Indian Method of Dispute Resolution, in NAVAJO NATION PEACEMAKING: LIVING 
TRADITIONAL JUSTICE 91–96 (Marianne O. Nielson & James W. Zion eds., 2005). 
116 TRIBAL HEALING TO WELLNESS COURTS, http://wellnesscourts.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/C3KK-S54D]. 
117 The Children’s Healing Center, RED LAKE NATION, https://www.redlakenation.org/the-
childrens-healing-center/ [https://perma.cc/AYD5-NR65]. 
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IV.  U.S. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING THE 
CIVIL JURISDICTION OF TRIBAL COURTS 
 Tribal Nations have been labeled the third sovereign in the 
United States along with the federal and state governments.118 However, 
tribal governments do not neatly fit within the U.S. constitutional 
framework. This section notes that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
inconsistently respected the sovereignty of Tribal Nations. Moreover, the 
Court has inconsistently followed the current overarching U.S. Indian policy 
of self-determination since the late 1960s in terms of supporting tribal 
legislative and adjudicatory authority within tribal territories. As discussed 
in the section on criminal jurisdiction, the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts 
has been subject to narrowing by U.S. Supreme Court decisions based on 
whether the defendant is a non-Indian or a non-member and whether the 
cause of action is based on federal law. Each of these lines of federal judicial 
limitations will be discussed in turn. 
One of the lasting legacies of the assimilation/allotment era of U.S. 
Indian policy in the late 1800s through the early 1900s was the allotment of 
the reserved homelands of Tribal Nations under the 1887 General 
Allotment Act.119 This law allowed the U.S. President to declare a 
reservation open for allotment. Once declared, the local U.S. Indian agent 
was empowered to assign to individuals and/or heads of households lots of 
the reservation lands ranging in size from eighty to one-hundred and sixty 
acres.120 Following the allotment process, the U.S. Indian agent declared the 
remaining reservation lands as “surplus,” with the U.S. Congress setting the 
price the U.S. would pay for the surplus.121 Once within the ownership of 
the United States, the U.S. President could set land aside for national parks 
or sell it to individual settlers within the reservation boundaries.122 By 
                                                           
118 See generally Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal 
Courts Remarks, 33 TULSA L. REV. 1 (1997) (referring to Tribal Nations as the third 
sovereign). 
119 Law of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (repealed 1934); see also PRUCHA, supra note 
32, at 170–73. 
120 PRUCHA, supra note 32, at 170. 
121 See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 13–14 (1995) 
(explaining that after the 1903 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lonewolf v. Hitchcock 
announcing that Congress was not required to obtain tribal consent for Indian affairs multiple 
federal surplus land acts diminished the reservation land bases). 
122 See Angelique EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic Experience of Genocide for 
American Indians and Alaska Natives in the United States: The Call to Recognize Full 
Human Rights as Set Forth in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, 3 AMER. IND. L.J. 424, 437 (2015) (“In reality, this was an illegal, unconsented to 
land grab from the Tribal Nations, and then a reappropriating of those lands owned by tribal 
peoples to the ownership of the United States on a might makes right basis.”). 
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implementing this law, the treaties reserving homelands for American 
Indians were forever violated by the United States. 
Reservation lands allotted to tribal peoples were held in trust status 
by the United States government and were acknowledged as within the tribal 
jurisdiction. Fee lands are parcels that private parties purchased on a 
reservation or within a tribal community boundary. Today, fee lands, and 
the jurisdiction of the fee lands, remain complicated based on the type of 
jurisdiction asserted. Thus, the labeling of jurisdiction on reservations as a 
“crazy quilt” of tribal, federal, and state jurisdiction.123 The reasons for this 
labeling will become more apparent following the discussion below. 
A.  The Montana Test for Jurisdiction over Non-Indians or Non-
Members on Fee Lands 
The 1981 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Montana v. United 
States124 dealt with an enactment by the Crow Tribal Council to prevent non-
Indians from engaging in hunting within the reservation boundaries.125 The 
state of Montana disputed the tribal authority and licensed hunting on fee 
lands within the reservation.126 First, the Court, relying on federal common 
law circumscribing tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, applied the 
same rationale to tribal civil jurisdiction. “Though Oliphant only 
determined inherent tribal authority in criminal matters, the principles on 
which it relied support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign 
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of 
the tribe.”127 Next, the Court set out a test for determining when a tribal 
government had the power to exercise jurisdiction on fee lands within tribal 
boundaries over non-members as follows: 
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other 
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through 
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to 
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on 
fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens 
                                                           
123 See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 
225, 234 (1994). 
124 Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
125 Id. at 549 ("Council has passed several resolutions respecting hunting and fishing on the 
reservation, including Resolution No. 74-05, the occasion for this lawsuit. That resolution 
prohibits hunting and fishing within the reservation by anyone who is not a member of the 
Tribe."). 
126 Id. at 548–49. 
127 Id. at 565. 
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or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the 
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.128 
Indian law scholars often refer to the two prongs of the test as the consensual 
relations prong and the direct effects prong. Applying the test to the tribal 
resolution, the Court opined that the tribal government lacked jurisdiction 
to regulate hunting on fee lands by non-Indians within the reservation.129 
1.  The Abstention Doctrine for Federal Courts and Exhaustion of 
Tribal Court Remedies 
Following the Montana decision, several non-Indian civil 
defendants invoked federal court authority seeking to override tribal court 
adjudications. In National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow 
Tribe of Indians,130 the defendants pursued an action in federal court to 
enjoin a lawsuit proceeding in tribal court, which arose from an insurance 
claim involving a negligence action when a youth was injured in a school 
parking lot located on the reservation.131 The U.S. Supreme Court applied 
28 U.S.C. § 1331, the statute conferring federal question jurisdiction for “all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States,” and held that this included the common law developed by the Court 
regarding tribal court jurisdiction.132 Through this reasoning, the Court 
upheld federal court jurisdiction to review whether a tribal court has 
properly asserted its jurisdiction over non-member defendants in civil 
actions.133   
This is a strained interpretation of federal subject matter jurisdiction 
and ungrounded in U.S. Constitution Article III, Section 2’s express “arising 
under” language stating that “the judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in 
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United 
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . 
. . .”134 The decisions or common law of the U.S. Supreme Court is not 
included in the list for federal question jurisdiction.  
In addition, the Court articulated an abstention doctrine for federal 
courts, requiring them to stay their decision until a civil defendant exhausts 
tribal remedies—through every level of the tribal court system—prior to 
making a federal determination on tribal jurisdiction.135 “Exhaustion of tribal 
court remedies, moreover, will encourage tribal courts to explain to the 
                                                           
128 Id. at 565–66. 
129 Id. at 566. 
130 Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). 
131 Id. at 847. 
132 Id. at 850. 
133 Id. at 851–53. 
134 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
135 471 U.S. at 857. 
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parties the precise basis for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide 
other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event 
of further judicial review.”136 
In a footnote, the Court detailed three exceptions to the 
requirement of exhaustion of tribal court remedies. First, where the 
assertion of tribal court jurisdiction stems from an intent to harass or is 
conducted in bad faith; second, where the action is “patently violative of 
express jurisdictional prohibitions;” or third, where exhaustion would be 
futile as depriving a party of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s 
jurisdiction.137 
The issue of federal court jurisdiction to review a tribal court 
determination of its jurisdiction arose next in a federal diversity of 
citizenship action. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Iowa Mutual Insurance 
Company v. LaPlante138 that federal suits brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332 under diversity jurisdiction also required abstention by federal courts 
and exhaustion of tribal remedies. The initiation of the lawsuit in the 
Blackfeet Tribal Court against the insurance company included a claim for 
bad faith in failing to settle a personal injury claim; thus, the federal court 
action was considered premature.139 “In diversity cases, as well as federal-
question cases, unconditional access to the federal forum would place it in 
direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter’s 
authority over reservation affairs.”140 
2.  Judicially Created Limitations on the Extent of Tribal Court 
Adjudicatory Authority 
In the final case in this legal thread, the U.S. Supreme Court opined 
in Strate v. A-1 Contractors141 that tribal courts generally exercised 
adjudicatory authority to the extent of their legislative authority, rather than 
territorial authority.142 Strate involved a highway accident within the 
reservation where a gravel truck struck the vehicle of a widow, who was also 
a mother of tribal members.143 The gravel truck was on the reservation due 
to a contract with a tribal governmental entity to complete landscaping 
                                                           
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 856 n.21. 
138 Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987). 
139 Id. at 9–10. 
140 Id. at 16. 
141 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). Justice Ginsberg delivered the majority 
opinion. 
142 Id. at 442. 
143 Id. at 443. 
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work.144 First, the Court held that the Montana test applied and grounded 
the assertion as follows: 
As to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe’s adjudicative 
jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction. 
Absent congressional direction enlarging tribal-court 
jurisdiction, we adhere to that understanding. Subject to 
controlling provisions in treaties and statutes, and the two 
exceptions identified in Montana, the civil authority of 
Indian tribes and their courts with respect to non-Indian 
fee lands generally “does not extend to the activities of 
nonmembers of the tribe.”145 
Next, the Court categorized the area of highway where the accident occurred 
as subject to a state right-of-way, to be fee land for the application of the 
Montana prongs—consensual relations and direct effects.146 In the decision, 
the Court states, “[p]etitioners and the United States refer to no treaty or 
statute authorizing the Three Affiliated Tribes to entertain highway-accident 
tort suits.”147 The fact that no treaty or statute was relied on should not be 
surprising as personal injury claims arising out of automobile use were not 
contemplated when the parties entered into treaties in the 1800s. In 
reviewing the conduct of the gravel truck driver and his employer, the Court 
held that neither the consensual relations nor the direct effects prong from 
Montana allowed for tribal court jurisdiction over the vehicular collision.148 
 Through these decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
announced limitations previously unknown to tribal court authority and 
sought to base its reasoning on the status of parcels of land within reservation 
boundaries and circular ideas concerning federal question and diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction under the U.S. Constitution. By instituting a process 
of federal court analysis of cases originating in tribal courts, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has created disincentives for the filing of lawsuits in tribal 
courts where the potential for the civil defendant to litigate through every 
level of the tribal court system and then seek review of the tribal court’s 
jurisdiction in federal court will be extremely costly and inefficient. In 
addition, tribal courts are being viewed as administrative bodies, forced to 
explain the grounds for tribal court jurisdiction for the benefit of a federal 
court down the line that will conduct its own analysis.149 This type of 
subsuming tribal courts into federal judicial processes is ungrounded under 
the U.S. Constitution and will be more fully discussed below.   
                                                           
144 Id.  
145 Id. at 453 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)). 
146 Id. at 454–56. 
147 Id. at 456. 
148 Id. at 456–59. 
149 Phillip Allen White, The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine: “Just Stay on the Good Roads, and 
You’ve Got Nothing to Worry About,” 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 65, 117–19 (1997).  
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B.  U.S. Supreme Court’s Barring of Federal Claims in Tribal Courts 
The primary U.S. Supreme Court decision on the filing of federal 
civil claims in a tribal court forum is Nevada v. Hicks, arising from a tribal 
citizen’s lawsuit against state officials claiming they unlawfully searched his 
reservation home and harassed him based on suspicion of illegal hunting on 
state lands. 150 Floyd Hicks brought claims in the Fallon-Paiute Shoshone 
Tribal Court against state game wardens and the state of Nevada based on 
trespass to land and chattels, abuse of process, and violation of civil rights 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including denial of equal protection, denial of due 
process, and unreasonable search and seizure.151 Both the Tribal Court and 
Tribal Appellate Court upheld tribal jurisdiction over the claims.152 
The civil defendants then filed an action in federal district court 
seeking a declaration that the Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction.153 On 
appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the reasoning in the Strate v. A-
1 Contractors case on limiting the tribal court’s authority to adjudicate 
claims to its narrow interpretation of tribal legislative authority over 
domestic tribal matters.154 In other words, the Court found that the tribal 
government did not have legislative authority to regulate the conduct of state 
game wardens or the state of Nevada, and thus, the tribal court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims.155   
The Court reviewed Article III of the U.S. Constitution and held 
that the “historical and constitutional assumption of concurrent state court 
jurisdiction over federal law cases is completely missing with respect to tribal 
courts.”156 Relying on the Strate decision, the Court posited that tribal courts 
are not courts of general jurisdiction, but rather have limited adjudicatory 
authority over non-members to the extent of tribal legislative authority.157 In 
Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion, he stated that tribal law controls 
whether tribal courts are courts of general jurisdiction as there is no federal 
law addressing the issue.158 
C.  The Flip Side: Enforcement of Tribal Orders by Federal Courts 
The Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have grappled with the 
question of whether under U.S. Constitution Article III, Section 2, there is 
                                                           
150 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 355–56 (2001).  
151 Id. at 356–57. 
152 Id. at 357. 
153 Id.  
154 Id. at 376–82. 
155 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at § 7.02[1][a], at 599–600. 
156 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 366–67. 
157 Id. at 367. 
158 Id. at 402–04. 
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federal question subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a tribal court 
judgment filed in a U.S. federal court.159 In 2007, the Tenth Circuit held in 
MacArthur v. San Juan County that a judgment granting relief, including 
injunctive relief from a Navajo Nation district court, filed in federal court 
for enforcement was a foreign judgment not entitled to full faith and credit.160 
As a foreign judgment, the Tenth Circuit applied the principles of comity to 
determine whether the Navajo Nation district court had proper subject 
matter jurisdiction over the non-member defendants.161 Further, the Tenth 
Circuit stated, “[t]he question of the regulatory and adjudicatory authority 
of the tribes—a question bound up in the decision to enforce a tribal court 
order—is a matter of federal law giving rise to subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”162 
In 2010, the Eleventh Circuit reached a different result in 
Miccosukee Tribe v. Kraus-Anderson Constr. Co.163 A tribal court entered 
a judgment for the Tribe in a contract dispute where both parties had agreed 
to tribal court jurisdiction for dispute resolution.164 When the defendant 
construction company failed to satisfy the judgment, the Tribe brought suit 
in federal court for enforcement.165 The Eleventh Circuit held “the Tribe 
has failed to explain the specific prescription of federal common law that 
enables it to maintain an action to enforce a judgment handed down by a 
tribal court in a proceeding to which the defendant consented.”166 The court 
distinguished the federal common law in U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
where non-members challenged the tribal jurisdiction from the instant case 
involving a signed contract.167 
In its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit summarized the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in finding federal question jurisdiction to review tribal 
court jurisdiction as follows: “[i]n sum, National Farmers dictates that a 
dispute over tribal court jurisdiction is considered a dispute over tribal 
sovereignty, and therefore—like a dispute over tribal sovereignty—is a matter 
of federal law to which § 1331 applies.”168 The idea that tribal sovereignty 
presents a federal question seems to completely miss the point that 
                                                           
159 See MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 2007); Coeur d’Alene 
Tribe v. Hawks, 933 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2019); Miccosukee Tribe v. Kraus-Anderson 
Constr. Co., 607 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 2010). 
160 497 F.3d at 1067 n.5. 
161 Id. at 1066–69. 
162 Id. at 1066. 
163 Miccosukee Tribe, 607 F.3d at 1274. 
164 Id. at 1270. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 1274. 
167 Id. at 1274–75. 
168 Id. at 1275. 
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sovereignty is governmental authority as determined by the government 
asserting its sovereignty. 
The Ninth Circuit in 2019 addressed the issue of enforcing a tribal 
court judgment filed in federal court in Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks.169 
The case involved enforcement of a tribal law judgment against non-
members for placing a boat garage and other installments on tribal lands, 
ordering a civil fine, and authorizing the removal of the encroaching items.170 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the action did not involve any claim arising 
under federal law, the U.S. Constitution, or a treaty of the United States,171 
but went on to find that tribal court jurisdiction had been limited by U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions in federal common law. This limitation provided 
a basis for a substantial question of federal law on whether the tribal court 
had the authority to enter judgment against the non-members.172 
These decisions illustrate the circular reasoning created by the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s announcement that tribal courts lack civil jurisdiction over 
non-members except in certain enumerated situations under the Montana 
test. The overreach exhibited in relation to tribal court jurisdiction has made 
it necessary for federal courts to engage in mental gymnastics to find subject 
matter jurisdiction to preside over tribal enforcement actions against non-
members.  
V.  QUESTIONING THE LEGAL BASIS FOR FEDERAL COURT 
REVIEW OF TRIBAL JURISDICTION 
 The first question to be raised in examining the U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions limiting tribal court authority is by what authority does the 
Court oversee tribal court jurisdiction. In Nevada v. Hicks, the Court 
correctly noted that Article III in the U.S. Constitution does not mention 
tribal governments or tribal courts.173 The U.S. Constitution under Article 1, 
Section 8 references tribal governments in relation to Congress: “[t]o 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with 
the Indian Tribes.”174 Tribal Nations are extra-constitutional and are not 
bound or otherwise within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Constitution.175 The 
U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the Tribal Nations’ extra-
constitutionality in the 1896 decision of Talton v. Mayes, holding that the 
                                                           
169 Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks, 933 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2019). 
170 Id. at 1054. 
171 Id. at 1055 
172 Id. at 1056. 
173 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 366–67 (2001). 
174 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
175 See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). 
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Fifth Amendment in the U.S. Bill of Rights is inapplicable to tribal 
governments, as they existed prior to the Constitution.176 
In justifying the ability of federal courts to review tribal jurisdiction, 
two federal statutes are used relating to the federal question statute: 28 
U.S.C. § 1331177 and 28 U.S.C. § 1362.178 Both statutes center on the types 
of claims brought into federal courts, and neither allows for the federal court 
to consider the decisions of another court system, namely tribal courts.179 
The federal question statute does not authorize review of tribal 
governmental authority or the jurisdiction of federal courts;180 rather, it is the 
enactment of the U.S. Constitution’s Article III provisions for federal court 
jurisdiction.181 In National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow 
Tribe, the Court engaged in circular reasoning that since the Court’s 
decisions have limited tribal jurisdiction, an analysis of federal common-law 
is required to determine whether the tribal court is properly applying tribal 
jurisdiction.182 
The question whether an Indian tribe retains the power to 
compel a non-Indian property owner to submit to the civil 
jurisdiction of a tribal court is one that must be answered 
by reference to federal law and is a “federal question” 
under § 1331. Because petitioners contend that federal law 
has divested the Tribe of this aspect of sovereignty, it is 
federal law on which they rely as a basis for the asserted 
right of freedom from Tribal Court interference. They 
have, therefore, filed an action “arising under” federal law 
within the meaning of § 1331. The District Court correctly 
concluded that a federal court may determine under § 
1331 whether a tribal court has exceeded the lawful limits 
of its jurisdiction.183 
This reasoning completely fails to acknowledge that tribal governments exist 
independently and existed prior to the U.S. government and the U.S. 
judiciary. Tribal governmental laws defining the civil jurisdiction of tribal 
courts are not derived from federal law and, thus, are not within the federal 
                                                           
176 Id. (“It follows that as the powers of local self government enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation 
existed prior to the constitution, they are not operated upon by the fifth amendment, which, 
as we have said, had for its sole object to control the powers conferred by the constitution on 
the national government.”). 
177 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018). 
178 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2018). 
179 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 28 U.S.C. § 1362. 
180 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
181 Likewise, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948) State and Territorial statutes and judicial proceedings; 
full faith and credit has not been interpreted to include Indian tribes. 
182 Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 852–53 (1985). 
183 Id.  
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question jurisdiction of the U.S. federal courts.184 Similarly, tribal 
governments are not diverse citizens and have sovereign immunity from suit 
in federal forums. Thus, the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, conferring 
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction on the federal courts, is also inapplicable 
contrary to the holding in Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante.185 
The second statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1362, provides that federal courts 
“have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or 
band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, 
wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States.”186 This federal law allows federal courts to hear 
claims brought by tribal governments but does not provide for federal 
review of cases originating in tribal courts. Rather, the statute clarifies the 
federal question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to expressly include federal 
question cases brought by tribal governments in federal courts. 
The default justification for the U.S. Supreme Court in curtailing 
tribal sovereign authority to adjudicate civil claims in tribal forums is the 
judicially announced “plenary power” exercised by the U.S. Congress187 and 
the common-law authority exercised by the Court itself.188 Neither of these 
announced powers are authorized by the U.S. Constitution or consented to 
by Tribal Nations. Indian law scholar, Robert Clinton, has aptly explained, 
“there is no acceptable, historically-derived, textual constitutional 
explanation for the exercise of any federal authority over Indian tribes 
without their consent manifested through treaty. . . . [N]either Congress nor 
the federal courts legitimately can unilaterally adopt binding legal principles 
for the tribes without their consent.”189 
VI.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: TWO PATHS 
FORWARD OR ONE STEP BACK? 
                                                           
184 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018). 
185 Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18–20 (1987). 
186 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2018). 
187 See U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886) (“The power of the general government 
over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is 
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must 
exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of 
its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been 
denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.”); see also, Lonewolf v. 
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority over tribal relations . . . has been 
exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political 
one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.”). 
188 See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 852–53. 
189 Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. 
ST. L. J. 113, 115–16 (2002). 
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 During the negotiations at the Treaty of Niagara in 1764, the two 
rows wampum belt was exchanged, denoting parallel governments in 
alliance: one row representing the British government and the other 
representing Indigenous Nations.190  
The treaty at Niagara was entered into in July and August 
of 1764, and was regarded as “the most widely 
representative gathering of American Indians ever 
assembled,” as approximately two thousand chiefs 
attended the negotiations. There were over twenty-four 
Nations gathered with “representative nations as far east as 
Nova Scotia, and as far west as Mississippi, and as far north 
as Hudson Bay.” It was also possible that representatives 
from even further afield participated in the treaty as some 
records indicate that the Cree and Lakota (Sioux) nations 
were also present at this event.191 
As Chief Justice John Marshall asserted in Johnson v. M’Intosh, the United 
States, as the successor government to Great Britain, entered into a 
relationship with the Tribal Nations.192 Thus, the two paths forward would 
continue to allow tribal governments, through tribal court systems, to 
provide dispute resolution in harmony with tribal values, laws, and ideals. 
The United States, as an ally to Tribal Nations, would restrain impulses to 
pressure tribal court systems to replicate Anglo-Saxon norms and laws. 
Rather, as allies on shared lands, the federal and state court systems would 
respect the legal processes of tribal courts. This may lead to consensual 
agreements on the issues of adjudicatory authority and an adherence to 
principles of comity and full faith and credit for tribal court decisions. 
A.  Current Quagmire of Creating Common Law Doctrine through 
“Plenary Power” 
One step back is for the U.S. government and courts to continue to 
coerce tribal courts into lesser and lesser authority and eventually seek to 
subsume these courts in an act of returning to colonization. These 
colonizing ideas of supplanting Indigenous legal systems with the 
surrounding European-based systems crop up from time to time and would 
swing the pendulum of U.S. Indian policy towards the negation of tribal 
governance. The pseudo-anthropological spectrum of human evolution 
                                                           
190 John Borrows, Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, 
and Self-Government, ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS IN CANADA: ESSAYS ON LAW, 
EQUALITY, AND RESPECT FOR DIFFERENCE, 155, 169 (Michael Esh, ed., 1997). 
191 Id. at 170. 
192 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 584 (1823). 
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with American Indians depicted on the “primitive” end of the spectrum is a 
relic of a racist, colonizing past, and should be put to rest once and for all.193  
Through the circular reasoning of plenary authority, the federal 
courts continue to overreach into tribal jurisdictions by crafting common 
law doctrine ungrounded in legal authority. The U.S. judiciary is charged 
with the authority to regulate governmental authority within the bounds of 
the U.S. Constitution. The entire line of cases surrounding tribal civil 
jurisdiction is outside those bounds and sets the course of the U.S. Supreme 
Court on a legislative track, rather than its judicial function.194   
As discussed above, the difficulties emerging from this overreach 
include further encroachments into whether tribal courts may entertain 
federal claims, whether non-members have exhausted tribal remedies 
before seeking federal court review of tribal jurisdiction, and whether tribal 
court judgments based on tribal law are enforceable in federal courts 
depending on the type of defendants involved. Further, a race-based non-
Indian/non-member distinction runs counter to U.S. Constitutional 
protections. Within this quagmire, tribal consent to U.S. Supreme Court 
review of tribal jurisdiction is completely lacking.195 
B.  Recommendation for Tribal and U.S. Full Faith and Credit Treaty 
As noted in the discussion throughout this article, the U.S. federal 
courts have repeatedly identified the Tribal Nation courts as entering 
foreign judgments but have also found federal question jurisdiction to review 
whether Tribal Nation courts have proper adjudicatory authority over non-
members. From this conflictual posture arises the need for a solution based 
on the government-to-government relationship between Tribal Nations and 
the United States of America. Within the U.S. Department of Justice, the 
Office of Tribal Justice would be the proper starting point to conduct 
consultations with Tribal Nations on consensual treaty agreements for full 
                                                           
193 An example of this type of discourse is found in American Indian Tribal Courts: The 
Costs of Separate Justice by Samuel J. Brakel (1978). “The tribal courts do not work well, 
and necessary improvements would require time and involve many difficulties. To 
perpetuate them at all runs counter to the evolutionary trends in the Indians’ relation to the 
dominant culture in this country.” SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS: 
THE COSTS OF SEPARATE JUSTICE 103 (1978). 
194 See Angelique EagleWoman, A Constitutional Crisis When the U.S. Supreme Court Acts 
in a Legislative Manner? An Essay Offering a Perspective on Judicial Activism in Federal 
Indian Law and Federal Civil Procedure Pleading Standards, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. PENN. 
STATIM 41, 42 (2010) (“Scholars of federal Indian law have pondered how to curb the 
highest court in the United States from running rampant over Tribal Nations when the court 
creates new standards, principles and laws out of thin air.”). 
195 See Matthew Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 45, 48 (2012) 
(“Tribal consent to federal statutes, regulations, and cases that decide matters critical to 
American Indian people and tribes long has been lacking.”). 
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faith and credit of judgments rendered by tribal courts and by federal courts 
within proper bounds. The treaties’ terms could provide clear guidance 
regarding the extent of tribal jurisdiction and the extent of federal 
jurisdiction relating to matters when civil jurisdiction implicates: tribal 
territory, tribal citizens, tribal court jurisdiction, U.S. citizens, and federal 
court jurisdiction. 
Rather than allow the U.S. Supreme Court to whole cloth create 
common law doctrines extending federal jurisdiction ungrounded in the 
U.S. Constitution or federal law, the treaty-making authority of the United 
States would be an appropriate alternative to realign the governmental 
understandings involving tribal court and federal court jurisdiction vis-à-vis 
each other.196 By re-engaging the treaty-making process, the overreach of the 
federal courts and the uncertainty around enforcement of tribal court 
judgments in those same courts would be settled through sovereign consent.  
 As an initial matter in such a treaty process, the United States 
Supreme Court should abandon the circular reasoning the Court previously 
used to limit the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts. Tribal civil jurisdiction 
should extend to the limits of the tribal territorial boundaries and be fairly 
applicable to all who enter the tribal territory.197 In recognizing the 
competency and cultural importance of tribal court jurisprudence, the U.S. 
government, as a treaty partner, has an obligation to join together with Tribal 
Nations for the benefit of justice throughout mid-North America. 
                                                           
196 See EagleWoman, Bringing Balance, supra note 8, at 704 (“Contemporary treaty-making 
would most likely center on the areas that have remained controversial as the United States 
has continued to expand and encroach on Indian Country. Treaty terms regarding the 
jurisdiction of Tribal Nations within their territories and limits on federal and state 
jurisdiction over those territories would necessarily be considered.”). 
197 See G.A. Res. 61/295 (XXXIV), at 24 (Sept. 13, 2007) (“Indigenous peoples have the right 
to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, 
spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical 
systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards.”). 
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